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Abstract 
A growing body of literature suggests that courts and juries are inclined toward division of 
liability between two strictly non-negligent or “vigilant” parties.  However, standard models of 
liability rules do not provide for vigilance-based sharing of liability.  In this paper, we explore 
the economic efficiency of liability rules based on comparative vigilance.  We devise liability 
rules that are efficient and that reward vigilance exhibited by the parties.  It is commonly 
believed that discontinuous liability shares are necessary for efficiency, but we develop a 
liability rule that is both efficient and continuous, based on comparative negligence when both 
parties are negligent and on comparative vigilance when both parties are vigilant.  Moreover, 
our rule divides accident losses into two parts: one part creates incentives for efficiency; the 
other part provides equity.  
Keywords:  Comparative vigilance, equity, economic efficiency, tort liability rules, Nash 
equilibrium, social costs, pure comparative vigilance, super-symmetric rule 
 
JEL classification: K13, D61. 
  
1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Tort liability rules determine how accident losses resulting from risky activities are borne by 
the parties involved.  The economic analysis of liability rules has typically considered 
accidents resulting from the activities of two parties.  This analysis has led to characterizing 
some rules as efficient and others as inefficient.  Models used in economic analysis have 
imposed certain conditions on the structure of liability rules, some of which vary from rule to 
rule, some of which do not.  The rules that have been proven to be efficient generally satisfy 
the following three conditions: 
(A)  When one party is negligent and the other is not, the negligent party bears all the 
accident loss; 
(B)  When both parties are non-negligent, the liability shares do not depend on the 
degrees of “vigilance” shown by the parties, that is, the care levels above and beyond what is 
efficient. 
(C)  When both parties are non-negligent, all the accident loss falls on just one party.
1  
While mainstream economic analysis continues to rely on these three conditions, they 
have been criticized by legal scholars.  In this paper, we analyze the implications of relaxing 
these conditions.  
We are motivated by the work of several scholars, including Justice Guido Calebresi, and 
by some court decisions. Various authors have criticized conditions B and C above.
2  
Condition C says that when both parties are non-negligent, one and only one party is liable for 
the entire loss; which party it is depends on the rule in force.
3  Calabresi and Cooper (1996) 
and Parisi and Fon (2004) have argued that when parties are either both negligent, or both non-
negligent, equity considerations demand sharing of liability - making only one party bear all 
                                                           
1 See the modeling of liability rules in Brown (1973), Diamond (1974), Polinsky (1989), Landes and Posner 
(1987), Shavell (1987), Barnes and Stout (1992), Posner (1992), Levmore (1994), Kaplow (1995), Biggar (1995), 
Miceli (1997), Cooter and Ulen (1997), Feldman and Frost (1998), Jain and Singh (2002), Kim (2004), Kim and 
Feldman (2006), and Singh (2007), among others. 
2 For criticism of the modeling of liability rules on various grounds including these two assumptions, see Grady 
(1989), Kahan (1989), Marks (1994), Burrow (1999) and Wright (2002).  
3 This party is the victim under the rules of negligence, negligence with a defense of contributory negligence, 
negligence with a defense of comparative negligence. Under the rule of strict liability with a defense of 
contributory negligence, however, the injurer bears the entire loss. 
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the loss is not justified.  Calabresi and Cooper (1996) and Honoré (1997) have recommended 
proportionate or comparative apportionment of accident losses in such instances.
4  These 
scholars have argued that judicial decision making is influenced by equity considerations.  
Moreover, some studies have shown that courts and juries are inclined toward comparative 
apportionment of losses when both parties are negligent and when both are non-negligent.  
This phenomenon has been observed in several countries, including France, Germany, Japan 
and U.S.  (See Calabresi and Cooper (1996), Yoshihsa (1999), Grimley (2000), Yu (2000) and 
Parisi and Fon (2004).)  In India, special legislation requires sharing of certain types of 
accident losses, when both injurer and victim are non-negligent.
5
Condition A requires that all the loss fall on the negligent party when one party is 
negligent and the other is not.   Kahan (1989) and  Honoré (1997) have  argued that this is not 
consistent with the doctrine of “causation.” (Also see Singh (2007).).  Under a standard 
liability rule like simple negligence, condition A implies that for at least one party, the liability 
share jumps abruptly from zero to one hundred percent, as that party goes from just meeting his 
standard of care, to just falling short of meeting that standard.
6  Kahan (1989) and Grady 
(1989), though on different grounds, have argued that this striking discontinuity is not part of 
the functioning of the law of torts.
7  
In short, there is a body of literature arguing that some of the basic assumptions of 
economic models are neither desirable nor in keeping with the reality of judicial decision 
making.   Nonetheless, the usual economic modeling of liability rules continues to incorporate 
conditions A, B and C.  The widespread use of these conditions is not surprising, because they 
have helped us to make precise and robust statements about the characteristics of various 
liability rules, including their efficiency properties.  Parisi and Fon (2004) have remarked that 
the discontinuity in liability shares (implied by condition A) provides strong incentives for the 
                                                           
4 Only rule that allows loss sharing is the rule of comparative negligence.  However, under this rule, loss sharing 
takes place only when both parties are negligent; not when both parties are non-negligent.  For an analysis of this 
rule see Schwartz, (1978), Landes and Posner (1980), Cooter and Ulen (1986), Haddock and Curran (1985), 
Rubinfeld (1987), and Rea (1987).  For a critical review of some of these works see Liao and White (2002), and 
Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2003). 
5 Sections 140 and 163 A of Motor Vehicle Act (1988) require that in instances of death and physical injuries, the 
victim be partially compensated if both parties were non-negligent.  
6 Note that if the victim is non-negligent, under the rules of negligence, negligence with a defense of contributory 
negligence and negligence with a defense of comparative negligence, the injurer’s liability jumps from nil (when 
he is non-negligent) to full liability (when he is negligent). Similarly, under the rule of strict liability with a 
defense of contributory negligence, there is drastic jump in the victim’s liability. 
7 See Mark (1994) and Miceli (1996) for commentary on Grady (1989). 
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parties to opt for efficient care levels.  Jain and Singh (2002), Kim (2004), and Singh (2006) 
have shown that these 3 conditions play a large role in efficiency analysis.  But, as we shall see 
below, the conditions can be relaxed along the lines suggested by legal scholars, without 
sacrificing efficiency. 
In this paper we will develop liability rules that are ‘equitable’ as well as efficient.  
When both parties are negligent (that is, taking less than the efficient amount of care), one 
party’s degree of negligence is defined by her shortfall in care divided by the combined 
shortfalls in care of the two parties.  We think that when both parties are negligent, an equitable 
liability rule should have liability shares that are generally increasing with degrees of 
negligence.  When both parties are non-negligent (taking at least the efficient amount of care) 
and at least one is vigilant (taking more than the efficient amount of care), each party’s degree 
of vigilance can be defined as her excess of care divided by the combined excesses of care of 
the two parties.  We think that when both parties are vigilant, an equitable liability rule should 
have liability shares that are generally decreasing with degrees of vigilance.  We also believe 
liability shares should vary continuously over all possible combinations of care levels.  And, of 
course, we want our rules to result in efficient outcomes.  That is, social-cost-minimizing care 
levels for the 2 parties should always be Nash equilibria, and there shouldn’t be other 
(inefficient) Nash equilibria. 
In section 2 of this paper we lay out our model and most of our definitions.  In section 3 
we briefly discuss pure comparative negligence, which, when both parties are negligent, makes 
each party’s liability share equal to her degree of negligence.  As is well known, under pure 
comparative negligence the efficient combination of care levels of the two parties is a Nash 
equilibrium (theorem 1) and there are no other Nash equilibria (theorem 2).  We then turn to a 
rule which closely parallels pure comparative negligence, but which is defined when both 
parties are non-negligent and at least one is vigilant.  This is pure comparative vigilance; it 
makes each party’s liability share equal to 1 minus her degree of vigilance.  Pure comparative 
vigilance and its relatives discussed in section 3 depart from conditions B and C above.  We 
show that the efficient pair of care levels is not a Nash equilibrium under pure comparative 
vigilance (theorem 3), and we construct an example to show that under pure comparative 
vigilance, there may be inefficient Nash equilibria which involve both parties taking too much 
care. 
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The negative results for pure comparative vigilance are interesting when compared with 
the efficiency results (theorems 1 and 2) for pure comparative negligence.  Under both pure 
comparative vigilance and pure comparative negligence, by increasing her care a party 
unilaterally reduces her liability share.  Why does this result in efficiency for pure comparative 
negligence but inefficiency for pure comparative vigilance?  The explanation is quite simple:  
when both parties are negligent, the “equity” consideration (reward more care) and the 
efficiency consideration (efficiency requires more care by both parties) are aligned.  In 
contrast, when both parties are taking too much care, under pure comparative vigilance, the 
“equity” consideration (reward more care) and the efficiency consideration (the parties are 
already taking too much care) are opposed. 
We then turn to modified versions of comparative vigilance.  We construct a rule that is 
analogous to comparative negligence with fixed division, and we show (theorems 4 and 5) that 
our rule of comparative vigilance with fixed division has the desired efficiency properties.  
Comparative vigilance with fixed division departs from condition C above.  Next we turn to 
variants of comparative vigilance which do not involve fixed liability shares, but which 
achieve efficiency by creating discontinuities on the boundaries of the area where both parties 
are non-negligent.  One such rule creates slices in the surface that represents a party’s liability 
share, the second shifts entire parts of that surface.  We establish efficiency results in theorems 
6 and 7 (for the sliced surface rule) and theorems 8 and 9 (for the shifted surface rule). 
The fixed-division comparative vigilance rule, as well as the sliced and shifted versions 
of comparative vigilance, all have undesirable discontinuities.  (In this respect they are like the 
traditional rules of negligence, negligence with comparative negligence, and so on.)  In section 
4 of the paper we develop a new rule which (1) has liability shares that are continuous over all 
combinations of care levels, (2) is based on the idea of comparative negligence when both 
parties are negligent and on the idea of comparative vigilance when both parties are vigilant, 
(3) treats comparative negligence and comparative vigilance symmetrically, and (4) allows 
increased care to reduce liability shares even when one party is negligent and the other party is 
non-negligent.  This rule departs from all three of the traditional conditions A, B and C.  And 
yet, this rule is efficient:  the efficient care combination is a Nash equilibrium (theorem 11), 
and there is no Nash equilibrium in the region where both parties take too much care (theorem 
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10) or too little care (theorem 12).  We call this new rule the “super-symmetric comparative 
negligence and vigilance rule,” or the “super-symmetric” rule for short. 
Mainstream economic models of liability rules require sharp discontinuities in liability 
share; our super-symmetric rule does not.  Mainstream models lean on conditions A, B and C; 
our super-symmetric rule drops all three.  Finally, our super-symmetric rule has one more 
feature that sets it off:  Standard tort liability rules allocate total expected accident costs 
between the two parties.  Our super-symmetric rule divides expected accident costs into two 
parts:  a fixed component equal to the party’s expected costs at the efficient care point, and a 
variable component equal to the rest.  Our liability rule apportions only the variable 
component according to comparative negligence, comparative vigilance, and so on.  This is the 
mathematical key to several of our results. 
.     
2  DICHOTOMOUS AND MIXED LIABILITY RULES  
 
Model Preliminaries 
We assume there are two risk-neutral people, X and Y, who engage in some activity that creates 
a risk of accidents.  An accident is an unintended and unforeseen bad outcome.  If an accident 
occurs, there is one victim, who sustains a monetary loss  , and one injurer, who sustains 
no loss.  We assume that X is the injurer and Y is the victim.  For simplicity, the loss 
0 > L
L  is 
assumed to be constant.  
Let x and  y  denote person X’s and person Y’s care levels, respectively, measured by 
their care expenditures.  Following the standard modeling in tort liability literature since 
Brown (1973), we assume that each person can choose any level of care between 0 and ∞, and 
that the probability of an accident,  , is a continuous and differentiable function of  ) , ( y x p x 
and  .  We assume that increasing care levels reduce the probability of an accident, and thus 
expected accident costs ( , and 
y
0 < x p 0 < y p ).  We also assume that, for all x and y, 
,  ,  , and  .   0 ) , ( > y x p 0 > xx p 0 > yy p 0 > xy p
When we need to work with an example of an accident probability function, we will use 
the following: 
 
11 (,) ( 1 )( 1 ) p xy x y
− − =+ +  
  5 
 







=− + + =
+
, 











31 2(1 ) (1 ) xx px y
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13 2(1 ) (1 ) yy ,  p xy
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22 (1 ) (1 ) xy yx p px y
− − == + + 
 
Total social cost (TSC) is defined as the sum of care-taking costs of both parties and 
expected accident costs.  That is,  (,) TSC x y p x y L = ++ . The social goal is, as usual, to 
minimize total social cost.  Let   denote the solution to this TSC minimization problem.  
We will assume for the sake of clarity in this paper that ( ) is unique.  We call   
the efficient care combination. 
) , (
* * y x
* *, y x ) , (
* * y x
 
Negligence-Based Liability Rules 
In this model, when an accident occurs the entire loss L  is initially born by the victim Y.  The 
court then enforces a liability rule, which determines where L  ultimately falls: on the victim, 
on the injurer, or on both according to some mixing rule.  A negligence-based liability rule is 
defined in terms of which parties are negligent.  If both are negligent, it may be defined in 
terms of the degree to which they are negligent; if both are non-negligent, it may be defined in 
terms of the degree to which they are non-negligent.  A party is negligent if her care 
expenditure is less than the court-enforced standard of care.  A party is non-negligent if her 
care expenditure is greater than or equal to the standard of care.  A party is strictly non-
negligent, or vigilant, if her care expenditure is greater than the standard of care.  We assume 
that everyone, including the court, knows the expected loss function and the governing liability 
rule, that the court can solve the TSC minimization problem, and that everyone, including the 
court, can observe each party’s care level accurately.   
Finally, we assume that the standard of care for each party is set at the efficient level. 
That is, for instance, party X is found negligent by the court if and only if she spends .  
This is an especially basic assumption, and we will use it throughout this paper.  We call it: 
* x x <
 
Axiom 1:  The court sets the standards of care at the efficient levels ( ).  That is, 
party X (or Y) is negligent if and only if   (or ). 
* *, y x
* x x <
* y y <
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For the related terminology:  Party X (or Y) is non-negligent if 
* x x ≤  (or
* y y ≤ ).  Party 
X (or Y) is strictly non-negligent, or vigilant, if 
* x x <  (or
* y y < ).   
Typically, legal rules only allow a court to distribute the loss L between the two parties, 
that is, to assign each party a fraction of the loss, greater than or equal to zero, with the two 
fractions summing to one.  Such rules will be called normal.  With a normal rule, a party in a 
lawsuit ends up with some loss between 0 and L, and the sum of the losses falling on the two 
parties equals L.  Non-normal rules allow the fractions falling on the two parties to be negative 
or greater than one (e.g., punitive damages), or to sum to numbers other than one (e.g., with the 
rest of society picking up some of the losses; or with both parties paying L, the “both pay full 
costs” rule). 
 Formally,  a  normal negligence-based liability rule examines the actual behavior of both 
parties, plus the efficient behavior of both parties, plus L, plus the probability function , 
and then enforces a normal loss allocation of the accident loss L between the parties.  A normal 
loss allocation is a vector of weights  , where 
) , ( y x p
) , ( Y X w w 1 , 0 ≤ ≤ Y X w w ,  1 = + Y X w w ,  = the 
fraction of the loss the liability rule places on party X, and  = the fraction of the loss the 
liability rule places on party Y.  In this paper we will only consider normal liability rules.   
X w
Y w
Negligence-based liability rules are usually defined by specifying how they operate in 4 
different domains:  Domain 1, where both parties are non-negligent; domain 2, where party X 
is negligent and party Y is non-negligent; domain 3, where both parties are negligent; and 
domain 4, where party Y is negligent and party X is non-negligent.  (See figure 1 below.)  We 
will sometimes lump domains 2 and 4 together, and describe them jointly as the one-party-
negligent, one-party-non-negligent region.  Because X is non-negligent if and only if
* x x ≤ , 
and similarly for Y, domain 1 is the set 
** {( , ) & } x yx x y y ≤ ≤ .  It will sometimes be necessary 
to partition this set into the point 
** (,) x y , and the rest (where at least one person is strictly 
non-negligent, or vigilant).  Domain 2 is the set 
** {( , ) & } x yx x y y < ≤  (that is, X negligent 
and Y non-negligent), and domain 4 is 
* {( , ) & }
* x yx x y y ≤<  (that is, X non-negligent and Y 
negligent).   Domain 3 is the set 
* {( , ) & }
* x yx x y y << .  We call a liability rule dichotomous 
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in a domain if it places all costs on just one party in that domain.  We call a liability rule 
dichotomous if it is dichotomous in all 4 domains.  For a normal dichotomous liability rule in a 
domain,   must equal either   or  .  For example, the familiar real world 
negligence-based liability rules are dichotomous in domains 2 and 4, where one and only one 
party is negligent; and they place all the losses on the negligent party in those domains.  (This 
is condition A from section 1.)  Such rules include simple negligence, negligence with a 
defense of contributory negligence, negligence with a defense of comparative negligence, strict 
liability with a defense of contributory negligence, and so on.  
) , ( Y X w w ) 1 , 0 ( ) 0 , 1 (
 
  INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
We now restate condition A from section 1, and we will call it an axiom here because of 
its importance in the real world.  We use this assumption in section 3 of this paper, but we will 
drop it in section 4, when we develop our super-symmetric rule. 
 
Axiom 2:  In domains 2 and 4, all losses fall on the negligent party.  That is, if 
** & x xy < y ≤ , then ( , ) (1,0) XY ww= , and if 
** & x xyy ≤ < , then ( , ) (0,1) XY ww= . 
 
In domain 1, where both parties are non-negligent, the real world liability rules are 
dichotomous; that is they place all the losses on just one party.  Moreover, that party remains 
fixed, no matter what the degrees of vigilance of the two parties might be.  The following 
axiom formalizes this idea, and is both simpler and logically stronger than the related 
conditions B and C from section 1 above.  Although axiom 3 (in combination with axioms 1 
and 2) has played an important role in efficiency characterizations of liability rules in the 
literature (see Jain and Singh (2002)), we will drop it throughout this paper. 
 
Axiom 3:  In domain 1, either ( , ) (1,0) XY ww=  for all  y y x x ≤ ≤ * & * , or  
(,) ( 0 , 1 XY ww= )  for all  y y x x ≤ ≤ * & * .  
 
Mixed Rules (or Fuzzy Rules) 
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We call a liability rule mixed in a domain if it places non-zero costs on both parties at some 
points in that domain.  For example, pure comparative negligence is mixed in the both parties 
negligent domain, i.e., domain 3.  We call a liability rule mixed if it is mixed in at least one 
domain. 
We use the following convenient notation throughout this paper:  For any x and any  , 
let 
y
* x xx Δ= −  and 
* y yy Δ= − .  Note that  x Δ   (or  y Δ ) can be positive, zero, or negative, 
depending on whether X (or Y) is vigilant, is at the optimum care level, or is negligent, 
respectively. 
First, suppose both parties are negligent (domain 3).  If both parties are negligent, 
then   and  .  Note that 
* 0 xxx Δ= − <
* 0 yyy Δ= − <
* x xx − =− Δ   is the dollar measure of 
party X’s shortfall from her proper (efficient) degree of care, and similarly with  y −Δ  and party 
Y.  The most natural way to define party X’s relative degree of negligence, or degree of fault, is 
set it equal to the ratio of X’s shortfall in care to the sum of the shortfalls of the two parties.  




x xy y x y x y
−− Δ Δ
==
− +− − Δ − Δ Δ + Δ
.  




x xy y x y
−Δ
=
− +− Δ + Δ
.  
Under a pure comparative negligence liability rule, the fractional parts of losses that fall on the 
















Note the following about this loss allocation rule:  For a fixed 
* 0 y y <− , consider party 
X’s loss share  .  It is greatest when  X w 0 = x , and it declines monotonically as  from 
below, approaching a limit of 0.  Note that   and   are not defined at the point 
; nor are the limits defined as (,
* x x →
X w Y w
) , ( ) , (
* * y x y x = ) x y  approaches  
** (,) x y . 
Figure 2 below illustrates   in the both parties negligent domain (domain 3).  X w
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 
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Second, suppose both parties are non-negligent (domain 1).  Then 
* 0 x x ≤− = Δ x  and 
* 0 y y ≤− = Δ y .  Can we define a mixed liability rule in this domain, with the same logic as is 
used for the rule of pure comparative negligence in the both parties negligent domain? 
For this purpose we will require that at least one of the inequalities be strong, in order to 
avoid having a zero in the denominator of a fraction.  That is, for the purposes of this 
discussion, we are assuming (,) x y  is in 
** * {( , ) & }\( , )
* x yx x y y xy ≤≤ .  At least one party is 
strictly non-negligent, or vigilant.  
In the analysis of pure comparative negligence, party X’s degree of negligence is defined 
as her shortfall in care divided by the sum of the two parties’ shortfalls in care.  Following 
Calabresi and Cooper (1996) and Parisi and Fon (2004), in the both parties non-negligent 
domain, we define party X’s relative degree of vigilance as her excess of care divided by the 




x xy y xy
−
=
−+ − Δ + Δ
Δ




x xy y xy
−
=
−+ − Δ + Δ
Δ
.  Note that the algebraic expressions for degree of vigilance in 
domain 1 are identical to the expressions for degree of negligence in domain 3. 
In the both parties negligent domain, for the pure comparative negligence liability rule, 
we let party X’s liability weight  equal her degree of negligence.   In the both parties non-
negligent domain, we obviously don’t want party X’s liability weight to be equal to her degree 
of vigilance; the idea is to reward vigilance rather than punish it. What makes sense is for party 
X’s vigilance to add to party Y’s liability weight.  The straightforward way to do this is to 
assume that the fractional part of losses falling on party X equals 1 minus her degree of 
vigilance, and similarly for party Y. 
X w
That is, when both parties are non-negligent (with at least one party strictly non-






Δ +Δ Δ +Δ








.  We call a liability rule that uses these weights in domain 1 a pure 
comparative vigilance rule. 
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Note the following about this loss allocation rule:  For a fixed 
* 0 y yy <Δ = − , consider 
party X’s loss share  .  It declines monotonically as  X w x increases.  It approaches a limit of  0 
as  ∞ → x .   As   from above, it approaches a limit of 1.  Note that these shares are 
defined only in the both parties non-negligent domain, and only if at least one party is strictly 
non-negligent.. 
* x x →
Figure 3 below illustrates the   we have just defined in the both parties non-negligent 
domain (domain 1). 
X w
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
It is tempting to define “degree of something” measures that are identical to the degree of 
negligence and degree of vigilance measures on their domains, but which are defined over all 4 
domains.  Can this be done?  We could use   (and  ) as defined above on domains 1 and 
3, and (following axiom 2) set  = 1 when party X is negligent and party Y is non-negligent, 
and  = 0 when party X is non-negligent and party Y is negligent .  This would produce a   
function defined over the union of the 4 domains, mixed on the both parties negligent and the 
both parties non-negligent domains, and dichotomous on the one and only one party negligent 
domains.  (The liability weights would have to be separately defined at the efficient point 
itself.)   This would be a pure comparative negligence and pure comparative vigilance rule, 
continuous over the entire quadrant, except at the point 
X w Y w
X w
X w X w
** (,) x y .  As we shall see, however, 
such a rule would be problematic, because of difficulties with pure comparative vigilance. 
In much of section 3 below,  in order to examine pure comparative vigilance, we will 
specify the weights in domains 1, 2 and 4, but leave weights in domain 3, where both are 
negligent, unspecified.  In section 4 below, we will define a new rule, over all 4 domains, that 
incorporates crucial features of both comparative vigilance and comparative negligence. 
 
3  EFFICIENCY AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
 
In this section of the paper, but not in section 4 which follows, we will assume axiom 2:  When 
one party is negligent and the other is not, all losses fall on the negligent party.  
  11 
Preliminaries – Pure Comparative Negligence 
In the standard theory of negligence-based liability rules, a rule is characterized by specifying 
how the accident costs are born in the 4 domains.  For instance, the simple negligence rule sets 
 = 1 if and only if X is negligent.  (Remember, X is the injurer.)  Therefore  X w 0 X w =  if both 
are non-negligent;   when X is negligent and Y is not;  1 X w = 0 X w =  when Y is negligent and X 
is not; and   when both are negligent.  The rule of negligence with contributory 
negligence as a defense sets 
1 X w =
0 X w =  if both are non-negligent;   when X is negligent and 
Y is not;   when Y is negligent and X is not; and 
1 X w =
0 X w = 0 X w =  when both are negligent.  The 
rule of negligence with comparative negligence as a defense sets   if both are non-
negligent;   when X is negligent and Y is not;  
0 X w =








 (“pure comparative negligence”) when both are negligent.  
Once a liability rule is specified, the economist asks whether the rule would induce 
rational X and Y  to end up at the efficient, social-cost-minimizing point  .  There are 
really two parts to this question, the first being:  Is   a Nash equilibrium under the rule?  
The second part is:  Is it the only Nash equilibrium?  Here are the questions and answers for the 
rule of negligence with a defense of comparative negligence.  Since these are well-known 
results, we omit the proofs: 
) , (
* * y x
) , (
* * y x
 
Theorem 1:    is a Nash equilibrium under negligence with a defense of 
comparative negligence. 
) , (
* * y x
 
Theorem 2:    is the only Nash equilibrium under negligence with a defense 
of comparative negligence. 
) , (




Pure Comparative Vigilance 
Next we turn to pure comparative vigilance.  The focus now is on domain 1, where both are 














 when both parties are non-
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negligent and at least one is strictly non-negligent, or vigilant.  We will assume that  XX ww =  
and  Y ww = Y  at the point .  Based on axiom 2,  ) , (
* * y x 1 X w =  when X is negligent and Y is not; 
and   when Y is negligent and X is not.  0 X w =
If we wanted to complete the specification of our liability rule at this point, we would 
have to indicate what the weights are in domain 3, where both are negligent.  But we need not 
do so at this time.  We can get several interesting results without completely specifying the 
rule. 
We start out by asking:  Do efficiency theorems like theorems 1 and 2 hold for pure 
comparative vigilance?  The answer, it turns out, is No. 
 
Theorem 3:    is not a Nash equilibrium under pure comparative vigilance.  ) , (
* * y x
Proof:  Suppose 
* y y = .  If X chooses 
* x x <  she is negligent and Y is not; therefore 
X is liable and pays all the accident costs.  Therefore she will want to move to the right, 
since she is attempting to minimize 
* 1(, ) x pxy L + .  Once she reaches 
* x x = ,   suddenly 
takes on the value 
X w
X w .  There are two relevant possibilities:  01 X w <≤ , and 0 X w = . 
 In the former case, X bears costs 
** (,) X
* x wpx yL +  at 
* x .  But farther to the right, at 
* x ε + , say,   drops to zero under the pure comparative vigilance rule.  So X does not 
stop at 
X w
* x , she moves instead to 
* x ε + .  Since 
* /2 x ε +  is always better than 
* x ε + , for 
any  0 ε > , there is no Nash equilibrium. 
In the latter case, party X has no incentive to move.  But now consider party Y.  At 
** (,) x y ,  0 X w = , and therefore  1 Y w = .  Party Y  bears costs 
** * 1( , ) y px y L + .  If she 
increases   by  y ε ,   suddenly drops to zero under the pure comparative vigilance rule.  
Therefore she moves to 
Y w
* y ε + , and once again there is no Nash equilibrium.  QED. 
 
The next question is this:  is there something like theorem 2 for pure comparative 
vigilance?  Can we rule out inefficient Nash equilibria in the both parties non-negligent 
domain?  We now focus on the part of domain 1 where both are non-negligent and at least one 
is strictly non-negligent, that is, vigilant.  The first thing to note is that no Nash equilibrium 
could occur where only one party is vigilant; they must both be.  For instance, if X is at 
* x x >  
and Y is at 







= .  Then X will want to move to the left, so they could not 
be at a Nash equilibrium.  Therefore we can confine our search for inefficient Nash equilibria 
in domain 1 to its interior, where both parties are vigilant.  That is,   and  .  0 x Δ> 0 y Δ>
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Under pure comparative vigilance, can we show there is no both-parties-vigilant Nash 
equilibrium?  We have the following conjecture:   
 
Conjecture:  Let (,) x y  be any point in the interior of domain 1, with both parties 
vigilant.  Then (,) x y  is not a Nash equilibrium under pure comparative vigilance. 
 
In the appendix we derive restrictive necessary conditions for (,) x y  to be a Nash 
equilibrium in the interior of domain 1, hoping to show those conditions make for an 
impossibility (of an inefficient Nash equilibrium).  But it turns out there is no impossibility, 
which we demonstrate in the appendix with: 
 
Counterexample to conjecture:  Let the accident probability function be 
1 (,) ( 1 )( 1 )
1 p xy x y
− =+ +
− , and let 
3 216 6 L = = .  It is then straightforward to show  
 . Consider the both-parties vigilant point 
** 1 / 3 1615 xyL = = −=−=
( , ) (6.3646,6.3646) xy= .  We show that (,) x y  satisfies the restrictive necessary 
conditions derived in the conjecture.  We show that  x  minimizes the burden on X, given 
the choice by Y of  y , and vice versa.  Therefore (,) x y  is an inefficient, both parties 
vigilant, Nash equilibrium under pure comparative vigilance. 
 
  We will now turn to modified versions of comparative vigilance, which respond to the 
disappointing results of theorem 3 and the counterexample above. 
 
Comparative Vigilance With Fixed Division 
The simplest modification of the comparative vigilance rule is to make it analogous to the rule 
of comparative negligence with fixed division.  In that rule, if both parties are negligent, their 
weights   and   are set equal to constant values, no matter what the degrees of negligence.  
The values might be  , in which case we would have the traditional equal 
division rule. 
X w Y w
1/2 XY ww ==
Suppose then we are in the both parties non-negligent domain, with at least one party 
strictly non-negligent, or vigilant.  In this case, let  ˆ X ww X =  and let  , for some constant 
, with  .  At the point 
ˆ Y ww = Y
1 ≤ ˆˆ 0, XY ww ≤ ˆˆ 1 XY ww +=
** (,) x y  we again assume the weights are  X w  
and  Y w .  Moreover we will require that  ˆˆ (,) (, XY XY ww ww ) = .  Following are the results that 
correspond to theorems 1 and 2. 
  14 
 Before proceeding, we need to introduce some notation for the part of total social cost 
that falls on X  and the part that falls on Y.  We call X’s burden  , which we abbreviate F 
when appropriate.   We call Y’s burden  , which we abbreviate G when appropriate.  
Therefore  , 
(,) Fxy
(,) Gxy
( , ) X Fx w p x y L =+ ( , ) Y Gyw p x y L = + , and total social cost is TSC F G = + .   
 
Theorem 4:  Assume ˆ X ww X = and  ˆ Y ww Y = .  Then   is a Nash equilibrium 
under comparative vigilance with fixed division. 
) , (
* * y x
Proof:  Suppose 
* y y = , and consider whether party X wants to reduce or increase 
x.  X’s burden at 
* x  is 
** * ** (,) (,) X F xy x w p xyL =+ .  To the left of 
* x  it is 
.  Since the latter function is minimized at 
* (, ) (, ) Fxy x pxy L =+
* * x  and since  1 X w ≤ , X 
certainly doesn’t want to move to the left.   Alternatively, consider a move to the right.  An 
incremental move to the right changes her costs by 








 However, since   minimizes TSC,  ) , (
* * y x
** 1( , ) x pxy 0 + = .  Therefore 
** ** ** ** 1 (,) (,) (,) ( 1 )(,)0 Xx x Xx X x
F
wpxy pxy wpxy w pxy
x
∂
=+ = − + = −− ≥
∂
 .  Because of 
the regularity assumed for the   function, any move to the right causes the burden on 
X to increase (or stay the same).  Similar arguments apply to party Y.  QED. 
(,) pxy
 
Theorem 5:  Assume ˆ X ww X = and  ˆ Y ww Y = .  Let (,) x y  be any point in the both 
parties non-negligent domain, with at least one party strictly non-negligent (i.e., vigilant).  
Then (,) x y  is not a Nash equilibrium under comparative vigilance with fixed division. 




Modified Comparative Vigilance – Variable Division 
Although the fixed division version of comparative vigilance gives us theorems 4 and 5, it 
presents us with those constant weights in the both non-negligent domain.  The constant 
weights seem crude and unfair, and provide no extra reward to the party who spends an extra 
amount on care, once both parties are non-negligent.  This brings us back to consideration of 










.  We know we cannot follow the pure 
comparative vigilance path, without some modifications to guarantee efficiency. 
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We now consider such modifications of pure comparative vigilance.  The first 
modification redefines   and   from the pure comparative vigilance definitions used 
above, but only on the line segments 
X w Y w
** {( , ) & } x yx x y y >= , and 
** {( , ) & } x yx x y y => .  
This creates slices in the   and   surfaces over those line segments.  The second 
modification redefines   and   on the entirety of domain 1, where both are non-negligent, 
and at least one is vigilant.  That it, it shifts the   and   surfaces over all of domain 1. 
X w Y w
X w Y w
X w Y w















 when both are vigilant, that is, in the interior of domain 1.  As before, assume 
weights (, XY ww )  at the efficient point 
** (,) x y .   On 


























.  On 



























Under this rule an increase in vigilance is always rewarded (or at least never punished).  The 
disadvantage of the rule is that it creates discontinuities along the line segment boundaries 
between domain 1, and domains 2 and 4, that is, slices in the   surface.  For instance, 
consider some fixed 
X w
* y y > , and let’s vary x.  As 
* x x →  from the left,  , because X is 
negligent and Y is non-negligent.  As 
1 X w =







.  However, at 













⎟ , which may be less than 1.  Viewed from above, the   
surface is continuous, except over those domain 1/domains 2 and 4 boundaries.  This 




Theorem 6:    is a Nash equilibrium under modified comparative vigilance 
with sliced boundaries. 
) , (
* * y x
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Proof:  Suppose 
* y y = , and consider whether party X wants to reduce or increase 
x.  X’s burden at 
* x  is 
** * ** (,) (,) X F xy x w p xyL =+ .  To the left of 
* x  it is 
.  Since the latter function is minimized at 
* (, ) (, ) Fxy x pxy L =+
* * x  and since  1 X w ≤ , X 
certainly doesn’t want to move to the left.   Alternatively, consider a move to the right.  At 
* x , X’s burden is 
** * ** * ** ** (,) ( 1 ) (,) (,) (,) YY F xy x wp xyL x p xyLw p xyL =+ − =+ − .  To 
the right of 














. This in 
turn equals 
** max( , ( , ) ( , ) ) Y
* x xp x y Lw p xy L +− . Comparing   at  F
* x  with the second 
term inside the max function, we note that  
** * ** ** * ** (,) (,) (,) ( ,) (,) YY F xy x p xyLw p xyLxp x yLw p xyL =+ − ≤ + − .  It follows that 
any move to the right causes the burden on X to increase (or stay the same).  Similar 
arguments apply to party Y.  QED. 
 
Theorem 7:  Let (,) x y  be any point in the both parties non-negligent domain, with 
at least one party vigilant.  Then (,) x y  is not a Nash equilibrium under modified 
comparative vigilance with sliced boundaries. 
Proof:    Let (,) x y  be a candidate N.E. in domain 1.  We leave it to the reader to 
show that both parties must be vigilant, that is, 
* 0 xx − >  and  .  X’s burden at 
* 0 yy −>







.  On the other hand, if she switched to 
* x  her 














.  Now if  (,) x y  is a N.E., 
it must be the case that  .  Similarly, Y’s burden at 








.  On the other hand, if she switched to 















.  Now if  (,) x y  is a N.E., it must 
be the case that  .  Adding the two inequalities together gives, after some 
algebra, 
* (,) (, ) Gxy Gxy ≤
** * * ** * * (,) ( )( , ) ( , ) XY x y p x y L x y w wp xyL x y p xyL + + ≤++ + =++ .  But this is 
impossible, since TSC has a unique minimum at  .  QED.  ) , (
* * y x
 
Shifted comparative vigilance.  For the pure comparative vigilance rule we have these 
two formulas for   and for the burden falling on X:   X w
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  (,) (,) (,) (,) X
x






The latter equation says that X’s burden should equal her own precaution expenditure, plus 
expected accident costs, minus her degree of vigilance times expected accident costs.  Now 
consider the following alternatives: 
 




px y x px y
ww
pxy x y pxy
⎛⎞ Δ
=− ⎜⎟ Δ+ Δ⎝⎠
− , and 
  ()
** ** (,) (,) ( , ) ( , ) (,) XX
x
F x y xwp x y L wp xyL p xyL p x y L
xy
Δ
=+ = − −
Δ+ Δ
 
Note that   is the social gain resulting from the two parties being 
vigilant, that is, the reduction of expected accident costs due to the two parties’ vigilance, 
abstracting from the extra care costs.  The latter of these two equations then says that X’s 
burden should equal her precaution expenditure, plus the expected accident costs allocated to 
her at the efficient point, minus her degree of vigilance times the social gain from the two 
parties’ vigilance.  Again, other things held constant, an increase in vigilance by a party 
implies a decreased liability share.  In a way, then, these alternative definitions of   and 
 are similar to the original definitions under pure comparative vigilance, except 
that now the emphasis is put on expected costs at the efficient point, and degree of vigilance 
times the gain from vigilance.  This pair of definitions provide the basis for what we call the 
shifted comparative vigilance rule, for which we define: 
** (,) ( ,) 0 px y L pxyL −>
X w
(,) X wpxy L
 




px y x px y
ww
pxy x y pxy
⎛⎞ Δ
=− ⎜⎟ Δ+ Δ⎝⎠
−  
 




px y y px y
ww
pxy x y pxy
⎛⎞ Δ
=− ⎜⎟ Δ+ Δ⎝⎠
−  
Clearly   under these definitions.  To ensure a normal liability rule, the liability 
weights need to be bounded, with 0
1 XY ww +=
, 1 XY ww ≤ ≤ .  That is, for example, if the   formula 
produces a negative number, a zero is substituted, and if it produces a number greater than 1, a 
1 is substituted.  Note that the shifted comparative vigilance rule is well defined, and the 
weights are continuous, over all of domain 1, including the efficient point 
X w
** (,) x y .  Under 
axiom 2, however, there will be a discontinuous shift in the weights as we pass between 
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domains 1 and 2, or 1 and 4.  For instance, suppose we start at some point in domain 2 where Y 
is vigilant and X is negligent, or 
* y y <  and 
* x x < .  At that  point  , by axiom 2.  
Moving right, as long as we stay in the interior of domain 2, we still have  .  Once we 
reach the border of domain 1, however,   will suddenly shift to 
1 X w =








, or to 1, 
whichever is less.  After passing that border,   will again change continuously.  X w
  Although it has the discomforting discontinuities at the domain 1 borders, the shifted 
comparative vigilance rule also gives us the desired efficiency theorems. 
 
Theorem 8:    is a Nash equilibrium under shifted comparative vigilance.  ) , (
* * y x
Proof:  Suppose 
* y y = , and consider whether party X wants to reduce or increase 
x.  X’s burden at 
* x  is 
** * ** (,) (,) X F xy x w p xyL =+ .  To the left of 
* x  it is 
.  Since the latter function is minimized at 
* (, ) Fxp x y L =+
* x  and since  1 X w ≤ , X 
certainly doesn’t want to move to the left.   Alternatively, consider a move to the right.  To 
the right of 





(, ) 1 (, )
(, ) (, )
X
px y px y
F xy x w pxy L
pxy pxy
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
=+ − − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
. 
This in turn equals 
** * * * * * * (, ) ( ) ( , ) (( , ) (, )) X F x y x xx w p xyL p xyLp x yL =+− + − − . In the 
move from 
** (,) x y  to 
* (, ) x y  care costs rise by 
* x x − , while expected accident costs fall 
by 
** * (,) ( ,) p xyLp x yL − .  Since 
** (,) x y  is a unique TSC minimizing point, the rise in 
care costs exceeds the drop in expected accident costs, or 
.  It follows that  .  In short, any 
move to the right causes the burden on X to increase.  Similar arguments apply to party Y.  
QED. 
** * * () ( ( , )( , ) ) xx p xyL p x yL −− − > 0
* ** (, ) ( , ) Fxy Fx y >
 
Theorem 9:  Let (,) x y  be any point in the both parties non-negligent domain, with 
at least one party strictly non-negligent (i.e., vigilant).  Then (,) x y  is not a Nash 
equilibrium under shifted comparative vigilance. 
Proof:    Let (,) x y  be a candidate N.E. in domain 1, with at least one party vigilant.  
The reader can confirm that both parties must be vigilant.  X’s burden at (,) x y  is 
()
** ** (,) (,) ( , ) ( , ) (,) XX
x
Fxy x wpxyL x wpx yL px yL pxyL
xy
Δ
=+ =+ − −
Δ+ Δ
.  On the 
other hand, if she switched to 
* x  her burden would be 
** * * (,) (,) X F xy x w p xyL =+ .  Now 
if  (,) x y  is a N.E., it must be the case that  .  Similarly, Y’s burden at 
* (,) ( ,) Fxy Fx y ≤
(,) x y  is  ()
** ** (,) (,) ( , ) ( , ) (,) YY
y
Gxy y wpxyL y wpx y L px y L pxyL
xy
Δ
=+ =+ − −
Δ+ Δ
.  
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On the other hand, if she switched to 
* y  her burden would be 
** * * (, ) ( , ) Y Gxy y wpx y L =+ .  Now if  (,) x y  is a N.E., it must be the case that 
.  Adding the two inequalities together quickly gives 
* (,) (, ) Gxy Gxy ≤
** * * ** * * (,) ( )( , ) ( , ) XY x y p x y L x y w wp xyL x y p xyL + + ≤++ + =++ .  But this is 
impossible, since TSC has a unique minimum at  .  QED.  ) , (
* * y x
 
4  A NEW RULE; THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS  
 
Preliminaries  
Both the sliced and shifted versions of comparative vigilance discussed in the last section have 
notable discontinuities along the boundaries of domain 1.  We will now eliminate those 
discontinuities by modifying the definitions of   and   in domains 2 and 4.  In doing so, 
we will abandon axiom 2, which requires (
X w Y w
, ) (1,0) XY ww=  or (0  in those domains.  That is, 
we now have a liability rule that is mixed, rather than dichotomous, in domains 2 and 4.   We 
will add a modified version of comparative negligence in domain 3, and we will end up with a 
brand new rule, which is a version of comparative vigilance in domain 1, a version of 
comparative negligence in domain 3, continuous over the union of all 4 domains, and efficient.  
We will call it the super-symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance rule, or the super-
symmetric rule, for short. 
,1)
We start with our domain 1 definitions for   and   for shifted comparative vigilance:  X w Y w
 




px y x px y
ww
pxy x y pxy
⎛⎞ Δ
=− ⎜⎟ Δ+ Δ⎝⎠
−  
 




px y y px y
ww
pxy x y pxy
⎛⎞ Δ
=− ⎜⎟ Δ+ Δ⎝⎠
− . 
Next we will form the corresponding   and   functions, representing the burdens 
on parties X and Y.  (The definitions of   and  , and   and   are actually 
more complex than we are showing because of the 
(,) Fxy (,) Gxy
X w Y w (,) Fxy (,) Gxy
0 , 1 XY ww ≤ ≤  constraint.) 
  ()
** ** (,) (,) ( , ) ( , ) (,) XX
x
Fxy x wpxyL x wpx yL px yL pxyL
xy
Δ
=+ =+ − −
Δ+ Δ
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  ()
** ** (,) (,) ( , ) ( , ) (,) YY
y
Gxy y wpxyL y wpx y L px y L pxyL
xy
Δ
=+ =+ − −
Δ+ Δ
. 
  Now consider a move from a point in the interior of domain 1 to the left, toward the 
* x x =  boundary.  The limit of  is  (,) Fxy
** (,) X
* x wpx yL + . 
  Next, consider domain 2, located to the left of domain 1, the region where 
* x x <  and 
* y y ≥ .  Axiom 2 would have  1 X w =  in this region, since party  X  is negligent and party Y  is 
non-negligent.  But this would create a discontinuity on the 
* x x =  boundary between the two 
regions.  Therefore we redefine   and    in domain 2 as follows (with the previous 
understanding about bounding the weights   and   between 0 and 1): 
X w Y w
X w Y w
  
** * (,) ( ,) (,)
(,) (,)
XX





     
** * ** (,) (,) (,)
(,) (,)
YY





Note that  .  It follows that the corresponding   and   functions are:  1 XY ww += (,) Fxy (,) Gxy
    ( )
** * (,) (,) (, ) (,) (,) XX F xy x wpxyL x wpx y L pxyL px yL =+ =+ + −  
  ( )
** * ** ( ,) ( ,) (,) (,) (,) YY G x y yw p x y L yw p xyL p xy Lp xyL =+ =+ + −  
Note that  .  (,) (,) (,) Fxy Gxy x y pxyL T S C += + + =
Observe that in domain 2, where 
* x x <  and 
* y y ≥ , the last term in  , namely 
, is positive, whereas the last term in  , namely 
, is negative (or zero if 
(,) Fxy
(





** (,) (,) px yL px y L −
* y y = ).  That positive term in   is the 
increase in expected accident costs resulting from X’s negligence, given Y’s actual choice of 
(,) Fxy
y .  And that negative term in   is the reduction in expected accident costs resulting 
from Y’s vigilance, if X were choosing her efficient level of care 
(,) Gxy
* x . 
Now suppose we are at a point in domain 2, and move directly right, toward the 
* x x =  
boundary.  The limit of  is again  (,) Fxy
** (,) X
* x wpx yL + .  It follows that there is no 
discontinuity of   at the  (,) Fxy
* x x =  boundary. 
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  Similar definitions are made in domain 4, where X is non-negligent and Y is negligent or 
* x x ≥  and 
* y y < .  To avoid a discontinuity along the 
* y y =  boundary between domain 1 and 
domain 4, we define the domain 4 weights as follows (with the previous understanding about 
bounding the weights   and   between 0 and 1):  X w Y w
 
** * ** (,) ( ,) (,)
(,) (,)
XX






** * (,) ( ,) ( ,)
(,) (,)
YY





Note that  .  Now the corresponding   and   functions are:  1 XY ww += (,) Fxy (,) Gxy
    ( )
** * ** (,) (,) ( , ) (, ) ( , ) XX Fxy x wpxy L x wpx yL pxyL px yL =+ =+ + −  
  ( )
** * (,) (,) (, ) (,) (, ) YY Gxy y wpxyL y wpx y L pxyL pxy L =+ =+ + −  
Note that  .  Also note that the last term in  , 
namely ( , is negative (or zero if 
(,) (,) (,) Fxy Gxy x y pxyL T S C += + + = (,) Fxy
)
** * (, ) ( , ) pxy L px y L −
* x x = ), whereas the last term in 
, namely  , is positive.  Now suppose we are at a point in domain 
4, and move directly up, toward the 
(,) Gxy (
* (,) (, ) pxyL pxy L − )
* y y =  boundary.  The limit of  is  (,) Gxy
** (,) Y yw p x y L +
* .  If we are in the interior of domain 1, on the other hand, and move straight 
down, the limit of   is again  (,) Gxy
** (,) Y yw p x y L +
* .  It follows that there is no discontinuity 
of   at the  (,) Gxy
* y y =  boundary between domains 1 and 4. 
  We have now defined  ,  ,   and   in 3 of the 4 domains.  It may be 
useful to describe   and   verbally in each of these 3 domains: 
X w Y w (,) Fxy (,) Gxy
(,) Fxy (,) Gxy





(a) her own precaution expenditure, plus (b) her own part of expected accident costs at the 
efficient point 
** (,) x y , minus (c) her own degree of vigilance, times the reduction in 
expected accident costs resulting from the two parties’ vigilance. 
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For the negligent party: 
(a) her own precaution expenditure, plus (b) her own part of expected accident costs at the 
efficient point 
** (,) x y , plus (c) the increase in expected accident costs resulting from her 
negligence. 
 
And for the non-negligent party: 
(a) her own precaution expenditure, plus (b) her own part of expected accident costs at the 
efficient point 
** (,) x y , minus (c) the reduction in expected accident costs resulting from 
her vigilance. 
 
  It remains to describe what we want to happen in domain 3, where both parties are 
negligent.  If we used pure comparative negligence, then each party’s burden would be (a)  her 
own precaution expenditure, plus (b)  her degree of negligence times expected accident costs.  
Using that rule would create discontinuities along the borders between domain 3, and domains 
2 and 4.  We now modify comparative negligence, to avoid those discontinuities, and to create 
a concept that is exactly symmetric to our shifted comparative vigilance rule.  What we want, 
in words, is the following in domain 3: 
In domain 3, where both parties are negligent, each party’s burden is: 
 
(a) her own precaution expenditure, plus (b) her own part of expected accident costs at the 
efficient point 
** (,) x y , plus (c) her own degree of negligence times the increase in 
expected accident costs resulting from the two parties’ negligence. 
 
The required definitions for   and   are as follows, with the usual understanding about 
bounding the weights   and   between 0 and 1: 
X w Y w
X w Y w
                                                           
8 In a sense, in domains 2 and 4, liability shares under the super-symmetric rule are consistent with the causation 
requirement in the law of torts. See Singh (2007). Also see Honore  (1997, p. 372), Keeton, Dobbs, Keeton, and 
Owen (1984), Hart and Honore (1985), Kahan (1989), and Schroeder (1997).  
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p xy x p xy
ww
p xy x y pxy
⎛⎞ Δ
=+ − ⎜⎟ Δ+ Δ⎝⎠
 
 




p xy y p xy
ww
p xy x y pxy
⎛⎞ Δ
=+ − ⎜⎟ Δ+ Δ⎝⎠
. 
The corresponding   and   functions are now:  (,) Fxy (,) Gxy
  ()
** ** (,) (,) (, ) (,) (, ) XX
x
Fxy x wpxyL x wpx yL pxyL px yL
xy
Δ




** ** (,) (,) (, ) (,) (, ) YY
y
Gxy y wpxyL y wpx y L pxyL px y L
xy
Δ
=+ =+ + −
Δ+ Δ
. 
But these equations are identical to the domain 1 equations for the shifted comparative 
vigilance rule!  Because of the domain 1/domain 3 symmetry (and, less important, the domain 
2/domain 4 symmetry), we call our new rule, defined over domains 1, 2, 3 and 4, the super-
symmetric comparative negligence and vigilance rule, or the super-symmetric rule, for short. 
  Since the super-symmetric rule is the shifted comparative vigilance rule in domain 1, we 
get the following from theorem 9: 
 
Theorem 10:  Let (,) x y  be any point in the both parties non-negligent domain, 
domain 1, with at least one party strictly non-negligent (i.e., vigilant).  Then (,) x y  is not a 
Nash equilibrium under the super-symmetric rule. 
 
We also have this easy result: 
  
Theorem 11:    is a Nash equilibrium under the super-symmetric rule.  ) , (
* * y x
Proof:  Suppose
* y y = . X’s burden at 
* x  is 
** * ** (,) (,) X F xy x w p xyL =+ .  As in the 
proof of theorem 8, X does not want to increasex.  To the left of 
* x , X’s burden is 
** * * * * (, ) (, ) ( , ) ((, ) ( , )) XX
* F x y xwp x yL xwp xyL p x yL p xyL =+ =+ + − , which is 
uniquely minimized at  . That is,  , i.e., X’s burden is higher at 
. Hence, X certainly doesn’t want to move to the left either.  Similar arguments apply 
to party Y. 
* x ) , ( ) , (
* * * y x F y x F >
* x x <
 
Turning to domain 3, where both are negligent, we can easily show there is no Nash 
equilibrium: 
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Theorem 12:  Let (,) x y  be any point in the both parties negligent domain, that is, 
domain 3.  Then (,) x y  is not a Nash equilibrium under the super-symmetric rule. 
Proof:  The strategy is similar to theorem 2.  Suppose 
* x x <  and 
* y y < .  Assume 
(,) x y  is a Nash equilibrium.  Person X’s burden is 
()
** ** (,) (,) (, ) (,) (, ) XX
x
Fxy x wpxyL x wpx yL pxyL px yL
xy
Δ
=+ =+ + −
Δ+ Δ
, and person 
Y’s burden is 
()
** ** (,) (,) (, ) (,) (, ) YY
y
Gxy y wpxyL y wpx y L pxyL px y L
xy
Δ
=+ =+ + −
Δ+ Δ
.  If party X 
moved to the right, to the domain 3/domain 4 boundary, her burden would change to 
** * ** (,) (,) X Fx y x wpx y L =+ .  If party Y moved straight up, to the domain 3/domain 2 
boundary, her burden would change to 
** * ** (,) (,) Y Gx y y wpx y L =+ .    If (,) x y  is a Nash 
equilibrium, neither can gain by making those moves.  Therefore   and 
.  Adding the two inequalities together gives 
. But this is impossible, since   is a unique 
social cost minimizing point.  QED. 
** (,) ( , ) Fxy Fx y ≤
** (,) ( , ) Gxy Gx y ≤
** ** (,) (,) ( , ) ( , ) Fxy Gxy Fx y Gx y +≤ + ) , (
* * y x
 
Important Insights 
Theorems 10-12 provide us with several important insights into the relationship between 
liability allocation and the incentives it creates for the parties.  The common impression is that 
the discontinuity of liability shares required by axiom 2 is important for providing efficient 
incentives to the parties.  (See the large literature cited in section 1.)  In contrast, under the 
super-symmetric rule, as we move within and across domains, liability shares change 
continuously. Therefore, the super-symmetric rule demonstrates that discontinuity in liability 
shares is not necessary for efficiency. 
There is another insight provided by the super-symmetric rule and related rules.  
Mainstream analysis holds that the economic efficiency or inefficiency of a liability rules turns 
on how the rule allocates total expected accident costs between the parties.  Recall axioms 2 
and 3.  Our analysis shows the contrary: that apportionment of only a part of expected costs - 
not of the entirety – can be used to construct an efficient rule.  It may be worth expanding on 
this insight. 
Suppose party X has spent x on care and party Y has spent y.  For these care levels, total 
expected accident costs are  .  For the purpose of determining liability of the parties, 
the super-symmetric rule divides this loss into two parts;   and 
L y x p ) , (
L y x p *) *, (
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L y x p L y x p *) *, ( ) , ( − .  Note that the first part,  ,  represents expected accident costs 
when the parties are the efficient point 
L y x p *) *, (
(* ,* ) x y , and is a fixed amount independent of the 
actual care choices made by the parties.  Moreover, the rule puts no restrictions on the division 
of   between the parties, other than that the shares  L y x p *) *, ( X w and  Y w  are given and fixed 
over the union of four domains.  The super-symmetric rule puts restrictions only on the 
division of   between parties.  This term is clearly a function of actual 
care levels opted by the parties.  The two parties’ shares of this component of loss differ across 
domains. The proofs of theorems 10-12 are sensitive only to these shares.
L y x p L y x p *) *, ( ) , ( −
9  
In short, we divide total expected accident costs   into two components, which 
play very distinct roles.  The division of the second component is carefully designed to ensure 
efficiency.  The division of the first component, although it must be decided on and fixed in 
advance, can be freely made to address equity concerns, without any loss of efficiency. 
L y x p ) , (
 
5  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Several legal scholars have advocated for a division of liability between non-negligent parties 
based on comparative vigilance.  In this paper, we have explored the compatibility of 
vigilance-based liability rules with the requirements for economic efficiency.  We have 
provided a rule that assigns liability shares based on the comparative negligence of the parties, 
when both parties are negligent, that assigns liability shares based on the comparative vigilance 
of the parties, when both parties are vigilant, and that is also efficient.  In short, we have shown 
that there are efficient liability rules that reward vigilance.  The reward scheme, however, is 
somewhat nuanced.  
 We have made two additional contributions to the existing literature on liability rules.  
We have shown that it is possible to achieve economic efficiency with continuous liability 
shares.  Moreover, our analysis has revealed that the correct apportionment of only a part of 
expected accident losses - not of the entirety of those losses – can be used to construct an 
efficient rule.  These contributions contrast with the mainstream beliefs about efficient liability 
rules. 
                                                           
9 Clearly, depending on the choice of care levels,  L y x p L y x p *) *, ( ) , ( −  is positive, negative or zero.  
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Our super-symmetric rule divides expected accident costs into two components.  
Division of the first component can be determined (and fixed in advance) in a way that 
addresses concerns about equity.  Proper division of the second part can ensure efficiency.  
 The resulting rule is efficient, has continuous liability shares, punishes negligence and rewards 
vigilance,
10 and allows room for equity. 
                                                           
10 Recall that under the rule, liability weights have two parts. The first part is always positive. The second part is a 
negative (positive) term whenever a party is vigilant (negative).   
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Figure 1.  The Four Domains.  Note the slanted lines show which domains contain which 

























Figure 2.  The   surface for pure comparative negligence in domain 3.  (Assumes 
.) 
X w
** (,)( 5 , 5 ) xy=



























Figure 3.  The   surface for pure comparative vigilance in domain 1.  (Assumes 
.) 
X w






We turn back to the pure comparative vigilance rule.  We will need the following partial 
derivatives of the   and   functions:  X w Y w
 





∂Δ + ΔΔ + Δ





∂ Δ+ Δ Δ+ Δ
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∂ Δ+ Δ Δ+ Δ
 
 
Recall that total social cost is given by TSC =  (,) x yp x y L + + ; that X’s burden is  , 
abbreviated F; and that Y’s burden is  , abbreviated G. 
(,) Fxy
(,) Gxy
   Let (,) x y  be a point in the interior of domain 1.  Recall also that TSC has a unique 
minimum at 
** (,) x y .  Therefore TSC is higher at (,) x y  than at 
** (,) x y .  Also, the regularity 
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assumptions on the   function guarantee that a small move from  (,) pxy (,) x y , towards the 
point 
** (,) x y , should reduce TSC.  Therefore a directional derivative at (,) x y , towards 
** (,) x y , should reduce TSC.  The direction vector is (,) x y −Δ− Δ.  This implies the following 
inequality:   




−Δ + −Δ + <
∂∂
 (1.1) 
Multiplying by -1 gives: 






>  (1.2) 
We are now ready to turn to the conjecture. 
 
Conjecture:  Let (,) x y  be any point in the interior of domain 1, that is, with both 
parties vigilant.  Then (,) x y  is not a Nash equilibrium under pure comparative vigilance. 
Steps toward a proof:  The strategy is to start with (,) x y , assume it is a Nash 
equilibrium, and derive a series of implications from that assumption which are ultimately 
impossible to satisfy.  Here are the steps, which do not reach the desired end: 
Assume (,) x y  is a Nash equilibrium in the interior of domain 1.  Then X is 
minimizing F at (,) x y , and Y is minimizing G.  First order conditions for minimization of 

















































, ) ) y L  for 
F ∂
y ∂
, dividing both sides of the inequality by  , and 
reducing notation then gives: 
0 L >










>  (1.4) 











 were both zero, then inequality 1.4 would become 
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()() Yx Xy xwp yw p Δ+ Δ 0 > , which is impossible, because  x p  and   are both negative.  
This means if (,
y p
) x y  in the interior of domain 1 and the liability rule is comparative 
vigilance with fixed division, then (,) x y  cannot be a Nash equilibrium. 
But now we return to the comparative vigilance weights.  Inserting those weights, and 
the appropriate partial derivatives in inequality 1.4 gives: 




xp p yp p
xy xy xy xy
ΔΔ ΔΔ
Δ+ + Δ+




Multiplying both sides of the inequality by 








−< Δ + Δ
Δ+ Δ
 (1.6) 
In the special case where  xy Δ =Δ =Δ, inequality 1.6 would reduce to: 
















Inequality 1.6 provides a necessary condition for a N.E. under pure comparative vigilance 
in the interior of domain 1, and inequalities 1.7 and 1.8 provide the corresponding 
inequalities in the symmetric case.  If we could show that these inequalities are impossible 
we would prove the conjecture, but we cannot, and in fact we have the following: 
 
Counterexample to conjecture:  Assume
1 (,) ( 1 )( 1 )
1 p xy x y
− =+ +
− .  Therefore 







=− + + =
+
, and 







=− + + =
+
.  We can easily find 
the efficient 
** (,) x y  by solving the first order conditions for the minimization of TSC = 
(,) x yp x y L ++ .  The FOC’s are:  
21 1( 1 )( 1 ) 0 xy L
−− − ++=  and  .  
By symmetry, at the solution we should have 
12 1( 1 )( 1 ) 0 xy L
−− −+ + =
x y = .  Therefore  , 
and .  Now let 
3 1( 1 ) 0 xL
− −+ =
** 1 / 3 1 xyL == −
3 216 6 L = = .  Then 
** 5 xy = = . 
We will now find a N. E. in the both-vigilant domain.  Of course we need it to satisfy 
the necessary conditions derived above.  Note by symmetry of the   function, any 
N.E in this example must be symmetric (with 
(,) pxy
x y = ), just as 
** (,) x y  is.  Given this 
















Therefore 1.8 becomes 
 
** 2 xxx < <+  (1.9) 
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Now let’s find the Nash equilibrium.  Consider party X, who is minimizing 
.  The first order condition is:  (,) X Fx w p x y L =+





pxyL wpL p L pL
x x xy xy
∂ ∂Δ
=+ + =− + =













− ⎡⎤ + += ⎢⎥ +Δ ⎣⎦
 
Finally, substituting 
* x x −  for Δ, and substituting 




(1 ) 3 2 1
2




= ⎢⎥ +− ⎣⎦
 
This polynomial has four roots.  Three roots fail to satisfy 1.9 above, but one does satisfies 
it.  It is 6.3646 x = .  It is easy to check the 2








positive at  x ; so X is (locally) minimizing costs at  x .  It remains to show that X cannot 
further reduce her costs by moving all the way into domain 2; that is, by choosing some 
.  To the left of 
* 5 xx <=
* x , 1 X w =  and 
1 (1 ) (1 ) Fx x yL
−− =++ +
1 .  This function has a 
local minimum at  .  But a calculation shows that   is lower at  4.4157 x = F 6.3646 x =  than 
at  .  Therefore X will minimize costs by choosing  4.4157 x = 6.3646 x = .  In conclusion, 
( , ) (6.3646,6.3646) xy= is an inefficient, both parties vigilant, Nash equilibrium under 
pure comparative vigilance. 
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